Ransomware attacks: Crisis negotiators explain how companies can regain control
Crisis negotiators Michael Sjøberg and Peter Skovbo outline urgent steps to contain ransomware attacks, avoid costly early mistakes, and restore operations.
The rising tide of ransomware attacks has pushed companies to rethink incident response, and two crisis negotiation specialists are warning that the first hours determine the scale of harm. Michael Sjøberg, a former Danish military hostage negotiator, and Peter Skovbo, who leads Delta Crisis in Switzerland, say negotiating with cybercriminals resembles classic hostage management and requires disciplined, preplanned responses. Their guidance centers on immediate containment, careful evidence preservation, and coordinated communications to limit operational and reputational damage.
Hostage‑negotiation techniques applied to cyber extortion
Former hostage negotiators say the psychology of ransomware demands mirrors kidnappings and sieges, with attackers leveraging fear to force rapid decisions. Sjøberg emphasizes that negotiating calmly, gathering intelligence on the adversary, and resisting reflexive concessions are core principles that transfer directly to ransomware incidents. Skovbo adds that specialized negotiators can shape demands, establish channels for measured dialogue, and prevent emotional decisions that escalate costs.
Containment actions every team must execute in the first hour
Rapid, methodical containment is essential to prevent lateral spread and data loss once an intrusion is detected. Incident teams should isolate affected endpoints and network segments, preserve volatile logs and evidence, and avoid blanket reboots that can destroy forensic traces. Engaging a pre‑identified forensic firm and legal counsel in the first hour helps preserve options and ensures parallel technical and compliance tasks proceed without delay.
Common early mistakes that multiply damage
Companies routinely make a handful of early errors that materially worsen outcomes and recovery timelines. Panicked attempts to restore from backups or uninformed reboots can overwrite critical evidence and obscure root causes, while ad hoc communications—especially on public channels—can inflame stakeholders and regulators. Another frequent misstep is relying solely on internal IT staff without external forensics and negotiation expertise, which can leave technical gaps and poor leverage in discussions with attackers.
How to rebuild control: forensic verification and staged recovery
Regaining operational control requires a phased recovery plan grounded in verified forensic findings and integrity checks. Delta Crisis stresses the importance of validating backups before full restoration, remediating compromised credentials, and rebuilding systems in hardened network zones to prevent reinfection. Negotiation teams work alongside forensic investigators to buy time for containment and to evaluate the credibility of attackers’ claims about data access or extortion tools.
Boardroom responsibilities and notification frameworks
Senior executives must centralize decision authority and maintain a clear incident commander to coordinate legal, technical, insurance, and public affairs functions. Organizations in regulated industries should follow statutory breach‑notification timelines and document decisions to meet compliance requirements. Skovbo warns that failing to involve cyber insurance brokers and regulators early can close off recovery pathways and increase long‑term liabilities.
Defensive measures to reduce future ransom risk
Long‑term risk reduction combines technical hygiene with practiced response routines and vendor management. Multi‑factor authentication, network segmentation, regular patching, and immutable, air‑gapped backups lower attack surface and blunt the impact of successful intrusions. Equally important are tabletop exercises that simulate ransomware scenarios, pre‑negotiated retainers with forensic and negotiation specialists, and clear crisis communication plans that protect customers and partners.
Preparation, rather than reaction, is the throughline of Sjøberg and Skovbo’s counsel: organizations that map decision authorities, secure trusted external advisors, and rehearse responses dramatically improve their chances of a controlled, timely recovery. No guarantee exists that paying a ransom will restore data or prevent future harm, so deliberate containment, evidence preservation, and informed negotiation are the most reliable levers companies possess when confronting ransomware attacks.
