Ransomware Attack Response: Ex-hostage Negotiators Advise Rapid Containment and Negotiation
Crisis negotiators Michael Sjøberg and Peter Skovbo outline effective ransomware attack response: containment, negotiation tactics, legal steps and recovery.
Businesses facing a ransomware attack can regain control by moving quickly to isolate systems, preserve evidence and apply negotiation techniques adapted from hostage crises, two experienced crisis negotiators say. Michael Sjøberg, formerly with the Danish military and specialized in hostage situations, and Peter Skovbo, head of Swiss consultancy Delta Crisis, laid out practical steps in a recent interview aimed at corporate incident responders. Their guidance stresses that the first hours determine whether an organization contains damage or faces prolonged disruption and higher costs.
Immediate containment and evidence preservation
Sjøberg and Skovbo emphasize that the earliest action must be technical isolation paired with disciplined evidence handling. Disconnecting affected endpoints, segmenting networks and taking forensic images preserve investigative options while limiting malware spread.
They caution against hasty reboots or blanket power-offs that can corrupt volatile data and destroy indicators of compromise, making recovery slower and legal response harder. Maintaining a documented chain of custody for preserved media is critical for later law enforcement cooperation and insurance claims.
Negotiation techniques adapted from hostage crises
Both negotiators argue that principles used in hostage negotiation — controlled communication, building rapport, and managing expectations — translate to ransomware response. Establishing a single, trained spokesperson and a measured, consistent communication channel with attackers prevents mistakes that can escalate demands or reveal sensitive negotiation positions.
Sjøberg notes that understanding adversary motives and limitations allows defenders to better assess the plausibility of decryption promises and to structure responses that buy time for technical remediation. Skovbo adds that negotiators should never improvise; every message must be coordinated with legal, technical and executive teams.
Costly early mistakes companies make
Respondents often compound harm through three recurring errors: delayed isolation, fragmented communication, and premature operational rebuilds, the experts say. Delays allow lateral movement and data exfiltration, inconsistent internal messages undermine trust, and rebuilding without forensic analysis risks reinfection.
Another common mistake is treating payment as the quickest fix without legal and technical counsel, which can result in incomplete recovery, encourage future targeting, or violate regulatory obligations. The advisers recommend documenting every decision and consulting with counsel and law enforcement before considering transactions with threat actors.
Coordinating with law enforcement and regulators
Sjøberg and Skovbo stress early, pragmatic engagement with law enforcement while recognizing jurisdictional and procedural constraints. Prompt notification can unlock investigative resources and support, but companies should also be prepared for investigatory processes that can slow immediate recovery.
Equally important is compliance with sector-specific notification rules and data-protection regulations, which may require disclosures to authorities or affected individuals within set timeframes. Legal teams should be involved immediately to interpret obligations and to craft required notifications that do not jeopardize investigations.
Operational recovery and forensic validation
Restoring operations is both a technical and managerial challenge that must follow validated forensic steps, the consultants advise. Recovery plans should prioritize critical services, use clean backups validated in isolated environments, and proceed with staged reintegration to prevent reintroducing compromised assets.
Forensic validation after restoration ensures that systems are not only functioning but free of lingering backdoors or persistence mechanisms, reducing the risk of a repeat incident. Skovbo notes that recovery timelines often hinge on the quality of prior backup hygiene and documented recovery playbooks.
Investing in preparedness and post-incident learning
Both advisers urge organizations to treat ransomware readiness as an ongoing program rather than a one-off purchase or policy. Regular tabletop exercises that simulate an attack, cross-functional incident response teams, and clear decision authorities reduce confusion in the first critical hours.
Improvements should flow from every incident through formal after-action reviews that produce prioritized remediation items and measurable controls, including testing of backups, stronger segmentation and updated vendor risk assessments.
In the interview, Sjøberg and Skovbo framed ransomware response as a coordinated blend of technical containment, structured negotiation and disciplined communications, where early, informed decisions limit harm and speed recovery. Their practical checklist — isolate, preserve evidence, centralize communications, involve legal and law enforcement, and validate recovery — offers organizations a clear framework to regain control when targeted by ransomware.
